Relationship between Religion and Science
The reasonableness of belief that God exists is a focal issue in the Philosophy of Religion. But the deeper assumption made by this model of faith as non-basic (justified) belief (as, too, by the model of it as basic knowledge yielded by the proper functioning of a special cognitive faculty) is that God’s self-revelation is primarily the revelation of the truth of propositions articulated in human language (compare Swinburne 1992). Alternative understandings of revelation are available, however. But this assumption about how divine inspiration operates may be contested, both on the theological grounds that it reflects the all-too-human desire to gain control over God’s self-revelation (to ‘pin God down once and for all’), and on the wider epistemological grounds that any attempt to grasp independent reality in human language will be in principle limited and fallible, subject to revision in the light of future experience. The merkaba, with its intricate geometry and profound symbolic resonance, stands as a testament to the enduring human quest for enlightenment and the endless possibilities that lie beyond the boundaries of our ordinary experience. Many have held that faith ventures beyond what is ordinarily known or justifiably held true, in the sense that faith involves accepting what cannot be established as true through the proper exercise of our naturally endowed human cognitive faculties.
If faith is not ‘firm and certain’ basic knowledge of theistic truths, then a model of faith as having a propositional object may still be retained by identifying faith with belief of relevant content-and the question whether a faith-belief may have sufficient justification to count (if true) as (non-basic) knowledge may remain open. It may be true, as Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology maintains, that if God exists then certain basic theist beliefs meet externalist criteria for knowledge, even though the truth of the propositions concerned remains open to reflective ‘internalist’ doubt. Another way to classify models of faith, then, is in terms of their associated epistemology-and, in particular, whether and according to what norms of ‘evidential support’, they accept that faith’s cognitive component needs to meet a requirement to be grounded on available evidence. In particular, it may be held that it is primarily the divine itself that is revealed-the reality, not merely a representation of it. In particular, the model of faith as assent to propositions as revealed holds that, since God’s grace is required for that assent, when grace is effective the whole ‘package deal’ of propositional revealed truth is accepted.
The development of propositional articulations expressing the nature and will of the self-revealing God-the doctrines of ‘the Faith’-will, of course, be understood as a process under providential grace. Or, if persons who have theistic faith readily abandon theological explanations whenever competing scientific ones succeed, their God gets reduced to ‘the God of the gaps’.) These misgivings about the model of faith as firmly held factual theological belief dissolve, of course, if success attends the project of showing that particular theological claims count as factual hypotheses well supported by the total available evidence. The externalist account of how Christian beliefs may have epistemic worth proposed in Plantinga’s model of faith (named ‘the A/C’ model because its sources are supposedly found in Aquinas as well as Calvin) offers some help with the required explanation, but (as noted in the final paragraph of Section 4 above) may arguably not by itself be sufficient. Technically, Mauna Kea is the tallest since it rises 13,000 feet above sea level and goes 20,000 feet below. But that conviction is not well described as ‘theoretical’, if that description suggests that faith has a solely propositional object. This question will be existentially important, since faith will not be of the kind exemplified by religious faith unless its commitments make a significant difference to how one lives one’s life.
On a fiducial model, having faith in God is making a practical commitment-the kind involved in trusting God, or, trusting in God. Models of faith as knowledge may be thought lacking because they admit no actional component in faith itself. Not all models of faith, however, identify it as primarily a matter of knowing or believing a proposition or a set of them, even with the addition of some affective or evaluative component. However, one hallmark during his military conquest was his tolerance of all religions. While a few Presidents had business experience, their main credentials were either the military or government. Barrett, Sam. “The first few minutes after death.” Popular Science. The cinematic depiction of Captain America might have a movie titled “Captain America: The First Avenger,” but Steve Rogers wasn’t the first Avenger according to the original canon from the comics. Everett Ross: Captain Marvel Connections? Whether that assumption can ever be sufficiently well founded to justify condemning and purging others is an important question, whose neglect may be seriously harmful, as we are reminded by the fact that the phrase for ‘act of faith’ in Portuguese-auto-da-fé-came to mean the public burning of a heretic.